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Justis: Justis: Avoiding a Minority Shareholder

Comments

Avoiding a Minority Shareholder
Oppression Claim in a Close

Corporation in Missouri:
The Impact of the New Close
Corporation Statutes
I. SCOPE OF COMMENT
The 85th General Assembly of the Missouri Legislature made major
revisions to Missouri's corporation law during its 1990 second regular
session.' Included in these revisions was a new section devoted solely to
"statutory close corporations." 2 This section is patterned after the statutory
close corporations section of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act of
1984 (RMBCA).3
Major revisions were made to Missouri's corporation laws in 1990 since
many people, particularly corporate attorneys, felt that the corporation laws
were outdated and in need of a significant overhaul.4 One area which many
people felt needed improvement was the standard of care required of officers
and directors. 5 The Missouri Bar-Committee on Corporations, Banking and
Business Law created a subcommittee in 1986 to search for suitable revisions
to the corporation laws.6 This subcommittee chose the RMBCA as a model
for the new revisions for a number of reasons.7 The close corporation section

1. See generally Act of July 13, 1990, H.B. No. 1432, No. 182, 1990 Mo. Legis.
Serv. 1310-47 (Vernon) (codified as amended at Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 351-59 (Supp.
1990)).
2. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 351.750-.865 (Supp. 1990). The Missouri corporation
statutes had not previously contained an integrated section pertaining solely to close
corporations. See id. §§ 351-359 (1986).
3. The statutory close corporation section of the RMBCA is now codified in the
Model Business Corporation Act [hereinafter MBCA]. See 4 MODEL STATUTORY
CORP. Acr ANN., Model Statutory Close Corp. Supp., §§ 1-55 (3d ed. 1990)
[hereinafter referred to as MODEL Acr].
4. See Final Report of the House Interim Committee to. Study Missouri
Corporation Laws 4 (Mar. 1990).
5. Id. at 4-5.
6. Id. at 5.
7. Id.
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of the RMBCA was appealing to the legislature because it permitted close
corporations to "act more like partnerships, rather than large, publicly-held
corporations, while at the same time retaining the limited liability of a
corporation."' The intent of the legislature in adopting the close corporation
section, therefore, was to increase the standard of care between officers,
directors and shareholders in a close corporation to that duty owed between
partners in a partnership.
This Comment will focus on methods of avoiding a minority shareholder
oppression claim in a close corporation in Missouri. Emphasis will be placed
on both close corporations created by the new statutes and "closely held"
corporations as defined by case law.9 Officers, directors, and majority
shareholders are all subject to oppression claims 0 and discussion will be
aimed at protecting all such parties from these types of claims.
This

8. Id. at 7.
9. A "closely held" corporation within the scope of this Comment is defined as
a close corporation that is not formed in compliance with a close corporation statute.
In other words, a "closely held" corporation is one that is judicially defined, as
opposed to statutorily defined. F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, O'NEAL's OPPRESSION
OF MINoRIrY SHAREHOLDERs § 1:01 (2d ed. 1985). Further discussion of the

definitions of the two types of close corporations and the differences between the two
can be found in Section II of this Comment. See infra notes 42-69 and accompanying
text.
10. The liability of these three classes of persons stems from the traditional power
structure of the close corporation in which the majority shareholders control the
corporation:
As a general proposition, a corporation operates under the principle of
majority rule: the holders of a majority of the shares with voting power
control the corporation. Persons holding a majority of the voting shares
have the power the elect all the directors, or in cases of cumulative voting,
at least a majority of the board. In turn, the board of directors usually acts
by majority vote; and, as a rule, directors are responsive to the wishes of
shareholders who elected them. Indeed, in most closely held corporations,
majority shareholders elect themselves and their relatives to all or most of
the positions on the board.
Under this pattern of corporate control, majority interests can deprive
minority interests of any effective voice in the operation of the business.
Further, the danger is always present that majority shareholders will use
their power to further their own interests to the detriment of minority
shareholders.
F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 9, § 1:02.
11. While this Comment is aimed at preventing minority shareholder oppression
claims from the viewpoint of those in control of a close corporation, the material can
be useful to minority shareholders in identifying the types of oppression normally seen
in a close corporation setting.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/3
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Comment utilizes four different types of sources to determine what constitutes
minority shareholder oppression in a close corporation.
First, Missouri case law prior to the enactment of this section will be
analyzed.' 2 Missouri courts had taken into account the special problems
involved with close corporations and were applying different rules to close
corporations before the new corporation section was enacted. 3 Ideally,
Missouri courts in the future merely will harmonize their prior results with the
new statutes.
Second, since Missouri's new close corporation section is patterned after
the RMBCA, the case law of other states that have adopted the RMBCA close
corporation sections also will be analyzed. Currently, Georgia, 5 South
Carolina 6 and Wisconsin' 7 have adopted this section of the RMBCA.' 8
The Missouri Legislature's concern'for protecting minority shareholders in
close corporations surely parallels these three states. 19
Along these same lines, any state which has made the effort to incorporate into its corporation laws an integrated close corporation statute shows a
concern for protecting minority shareholders. 20 Many of these integrated

12. This integrated close corporation section was enacted on July 13, 1990. See
supra note 1.
13. See, e.g., Delahoussaye v. Newhard, 785 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990);
Herbik v. Rand, 732 S.W.2d 232, 234-35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
14. The new statutes should not effectively change any of the prior case law in
Missouri pertaining to "closely held" corporations. A discussion of the reasons for this
assertion can be found in Section I of this Comment. See infra notes 70-75 and
accompanying text.
15. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-901 to -950 (1990).
16. See S.C. CODE §§ 33-18-101 to -18-500 (Law. Co-op. 1990).
17. See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 180.995 (West Supp. 1990).
18. This list of states was compiled as of November 14, 1989. See MODEL Acr,
supra note 3, commentary at 1868-69.
19. Arguably, any state legislature which adopts an integrated close corporation
section has similar legislative intentions to those of the Missouri Legislature when it
enacted this statute. It is this writer's opinion that the intentions of a state legislature
which adopted the RMBCA almost verbatim are even more similar to the intentions
of the Missouri Legislature which also adopted the RMBCA almost verbatim.
20. Thirteen other states had adopted integrated close corporation statutes as of
November 14, 1989: Alabama, Arizona, California, Delaware, Illinois, Kansas,
Maryland, Nevada, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, and Wyoming. See
MODEL Acr, supra note 3, commentary at 1868-69.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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statutes resemble the RMBCA section.2 Case law from these states should
also be helpful.
Third, the modem trends in minority shareholder oppression cases are an
important area of the law which must be analyzed. This analysis is important
because most modern corporation scholars feel that the law is shifting to allow
more successful oppression claims by minority shareholders. 22 Groundbreaking decisions concerning the duties .between shareholders in close
corporations are occurring with more frequency and should
enable us to
23
predict possible future trends in this area of corporation law.
Finally, written works by modem legal scholars in corporation law are
analyzed. One of the most influential scholars in this area is Professor F.
Hodge O'Neal.
Professor O'Neal and Professor Robert B. Thompson zs
wrote a two-volume treatise entitled O'Neal's Close Corporations' and
another two-volume treatise entitled O'Neal's Oppression of Minority
2 7 Both of these treatises
Shareholders.
are relied upon heavily for information contained in this Comment.
The first thing one must do before attempting to define what constitutes
minority shareholder oppression in a close corporation is to define fully a
close corporation. Whether a corporation is a close corporation under the
statute or under the judicial definition of a closely held corporation may make
a difference in an oppression claim. Section II of this Comment defines a

21. Compare MODEL Acr, supra note 3, with ALA. CODE §§ 10-2A-300 to -2A313 (1987); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-201 to -218 (1990); CAL. CORP. CODE §
158 (West 1990); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341-56 (1983 and Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 32, paras. 1201-16 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-7201
to -7216 (1988); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 4-101 to -603 (1985 & Supp.
1990); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 78A.010-.200 (1989); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.591
(Anderson Supp. 1989); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2301-37 (Purdon Supp. 1990);
R.I. GEN. LAws § 7-1.1-51 (1987); TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. arts. 12.01-.54
(Vernon 1990); WYO. STAT. §§ 17-17-101 to -17-151 (1989).
22. See generally F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPsON, supra note 9, § 1:05; Berger,

Statutory Close or Closely Held Corporation?, 11 PAC. L.J. 699 (1980); Kutcher,
Freezeouts of Minority Shareholders in Closely-Held Corporations,25 LA. B.J. 123
(1977).
23. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 848-49,

353 N.E.2d 657, 661 (1976).
24. Professor O'Neal teaches law at Washington University in St. Louis, Mo. He
is a member of the Missouri, Georgia and Louisiana Bars.
25. Professor Thompson also teaches law at Washington University. He is a

member of the Missouri and Georgia Bars.
26. F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1988).
27. F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 9.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/3
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close corporation both statutorily and judicially and discusses the possible
differences between the two.'
After understanding the definition of a close corporation, one must
understand the fiduciary duty owed to a minority shareholder in a close
corporation. All cases of minority shareholder oppression are based upon a
breach of fiduciary duty.' Section III of this Comment will analyze this
fiduciary duty.30
An oppression claim by a minority shareholder can stem from a myriad
of fact situations. Whether minority shareholder oppression exists will depend
upon the circumstances of each case.3' Consequently, any article on methods
to avoid a minority shareholder oppression claim will have two problems. It
cannot be all-inclusive on every possible type of oppression on the one hand,
and it must err on the side of cautiousness on the other hand. This Comment
is geared as a "preventive law" article and as such will err on the side of
cautiousness. With these thoughts in mind, Section IV will analyze eight
major areas of minority shareholder oppression:
(1) shareholders' expectations of a declared dividend or a
continued salary;32
(2) the requirement that there be legitimate business purposes
for any corporate actions that are not outweighed by any legitimate
33
objectives which are less harmful to the minority shareholders;
(3) diversion of corporate funds for the personal use of the
directors, officers or majority shareholders;3
(4) voluntary disclosure of any germane
facts which may affect
35
the value of the shareholders' stock;
(5) loans of corporate funds to officers, directors or majority
shareholders;6
(6) issuance of new shares of stock, recapitalization
and
37
corporation;
the
of
capital
stated
the
in
changes

-

28. See infra notes 42-69 and accompanying text.
29. See generally Annotation, What Amounts to "Oppr'essive" Conduct Under
Statute Authorizing Dissolution of Corporationat Suit of Minority Shareholders,56
A.L.R.3D 358 (1974).
30. See infra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
31. Herbik, 732 S.W.2d at 234.
32. See infra notes 77-117 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 118-39 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 140-67 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 168-97 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 198-211 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 212-23 and accompanying text.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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(7) usurpation of a business opportunity of the corporation;3 8
and
(8) general treatment of minority shareholders. 9
This Comment will be summarized in Section V by a list of suggestions
to avoid a minority shareholder oppression claim in a close corporation in
Missouri. ° This list should be a helpful tool for practicing attorneys in
preventing a minority shareholder oppression claim before it occurs. Copies
of this list also could be handed out to close corporation clients as part of the
practice of "preventive law." Professor O'Neal has stated that the study of
minority shareholder oppression aids a corporate lawyer in practicing
preventive law in two ways:
First, . . . it enables a lawyer representing persons entering business
enterprises to take effective steps when the business is being organized or
before trouble develops to guard the interests of his clients. Perhaps
equally important, ... [such a study] should enable businessmen and
women, lawyers, and other business advisers to remove in advance some of
the conflicts of interest, sources of tension, and other possible causes of
squeeze-outs, and to set.up measures for solving whatever disputes do
arise. 4'
II. STATUTORY CLOSE CORPORATION V.
CLOSELY HELD CORPORATION
The statutory definition of a close corporation under Missouri's new close
corporation section contains two requirements. First, "[a] statutory close
corporation is a corporation whose articles of incorporation contain a
statement that the corporation is a statutory close corporation."4 Second, a
43
statutory close corporation must have "fifty or fewer shareholders.1
Additional provisions of the statute provide the different rules for corporations
electing to become statutory close corporations as opposed to general or public
corporations. ' For purposes of the definition of a statutory close corporation, the fifty-shareholder limit and the intent of the corporation as evidenced
by a reference in the articles of incorporation are the two important factors.

38. See infra notes 224-45 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 246-65 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 266-321 and accompanying text.
41. F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 9, § 1:05.
42. Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.755.1 (Supp. 1990).
43. Id. § 351.755.2.
44. See generally id. §§ 351.755-.845.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/3
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A close corporation also is defined judicially in all jurisdictions."
Judicially-defined close corporations are often referred to as "closely held"
corporations. ' 6 Therefore, a close corporation which has been defined
judicially and not statutorily will be labelled a closely held corporation for
purposes of this Comment. Closely held corporations are not limited literally
by the number of shareholders. Also, the intention of the corporation as
evidenced by the articles of incorporation may be insignificant as to whether
the corporation is "closely held."47
The definition of a closely held corporation in Missouri was thoroughly
discussed in Forinashv. Daugherty.4 8 Forinashlisted the characteristics of
a closely held corporation as discussed in earlier Missouri cases and cases

from other jurisdictions.49 One Missouri court held that a corporation was
closely held when its "stock was not listed upon any stock exchange" and
when it "had no over-the-counter market." o Another court defined a closely
held corporation "to be one in which the stock is owned by comparatively few
persons who are active in the management of the company, and the shares are
not listed on any exchange or otherwise traded in public."5' Still another
Missouri case 2 used the same definition as the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts in the "groundbreaking" close corporation case, Donahue v.
Rodd Electrotype Co.5 "The Massachusetts court deemed a close corporation to be typified by (1) a small number of shareholders; (2) no ready market

45. All jurisdictions use a different standard for close corporations even if the
jurisdiction does not have an integrated close corporation statute Confirmation of this
fact can be accomplished with a quick check on WESTLAW or LEXIS under the
search terms "close corporation!" in the database ALLSTATES. At least one citation
from each state will appear.
46. See, e.g., Forinash v. Daugherty, 697 S.W.2d 294, 299 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)
("The merits of this case are controlled by the law of corporations, particularly those
described as 'close' of 'closely held' corporations."). See generally Berger, supra note
22.
47. No definition of a "closely held" corporation listed in the following text and
notes gives an upper limit on the possible number of shareholders. Nor does any
definition refer to the intention of the corporation as evidenced from its articles of
incorporation. See infra notes 48-60 and accompanying text.
48. 697 S.W.2d 294 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
49. Id.at 302-04.
50. Id. at 303 (quoting Phelps v. Watson-Stillman Co., 365 Mo. 1124, 1127, 293
S.W.2d 429, 431 (1956)).
51. Flarsheim v. Twenty Five Thirty Two Broadway Corp., 432 S.W.2d 245,255
(Mo. 1968). See also Forinash, 697 S.W.2d at 303.
52. Hopkins v. Hopkins, 597 S.W.2d 702 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
53. 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975). Donahue is cited as one of the first
cases to recognize the rights of minority shareholders in close corporations.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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for the corporate stock; and (3) substantial majority stockholder participation
54
in the management, direction and operations of the corporation."
Professor O'Neal also indicates that a closely held corporation has been
defined in many different ways.55 He lists many factors used by the courts
and other legal scholars to define a closely held corporation: (1) relatively
few shareholders; (2) shares are not readily traded on the market; (3)
shareholders treat each other as partners; and (4) management and ownership
are substantially identical 5 6 O'Neal concludes, though, that the most
the corporation's "shares
important factor of a closely held corporation is that
57
are not generally traded in the securities markets."
Another commentator has listed the following characteristics for a closely
held corporation:
(1) the shareholders are few in number, often only two or three;
(2) they usually live in the same geographical area, know each other,
and are well acquainted with each other's business skills;
(3) all or most of the shareholders are active in the business, usually
serving as directors or officers or a key man in some managerial capacity;
and
(4) there is no established market for the corporate stock, the shares
not being listed on a stock exchange or actively dealt in by brokers; little
or no trading takes place in the shares.ss
Obviously, closely held corporations have been defined in many different
ways using many different factors. Furthermore, in Missouri, members of a
general or public corporation may be held to have the same fiduciary duties
of a close corporation even when the corporation is not a statutory close
corporation or a closely held corporation. Forinash held that a corporation
was subject to the higher fiduciary duty imposed upon a close corporation

54. Forinash, 697 S.W.2d at 303. See also Donahue, 367 Mass. at 586, 328
N.E.2d at 511.
55. F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 26, § 1:02.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Berger, supra note 22, at 700. A slightly different definition has been used
in an American Law Report annotation article on closely held corporations:
First, the stockholders are few; second, most or all of them are active as
officers and directors; third, circulation of the stocks is restricted among the
present stockholders or there is no ready market for their shares; and fourth,
the stockholders are usually related to each other and know each other well.
Annotation, Duty and Liability of Closely Held Corporation, its Directors,Officers,
orMajorityStockholders, inAcquiringStock ofMinority Shareholder,7 A.L.R.3D 500,
501 (1966).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/3
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even though that particular corporation was not a closely held corporation
within the definition adopted by prigr Missouri decisions. 59 Consequently,
a public corporation which has some but not all the characteristics of a closely
held corporation may be subject to the same fiduciary duty as a close
corporation.
Labelling a close corporation as either "statutory" or "closely held" may
not have much significance in a minority shareholder oppression case. The
close corporation statute lists the types of relief available to a minority
shareholder in a successful oppression claim:
(1) [t]he performance, prohibition, alteration, or setting aside of any
action of the corporation or 'of its shareholders, directors, or officers or of
any other party to the proceeding;
(2) [t]he cancellation or alteration of any provision in the corporation's
articles of incorporation or bylaws;
(3) [t]he removal from office of any director or officer;
(4) [t]he appointment of any individual as a director or officer;
(5) [a]n accounting with respect to any matter in dispute;
(6) [t]he appointment of a custodian to manage the business and
affairs of the corporation;
(7) [t]he appointment of a provisional director, who has all the rights,
powers, and duties of a duly elected director, to serve for the term and
under the conditions prescribed by the court;
(8) [t]he payment of dividends;
(9) [t]he award of damages to any aggrieved party.60
Furthermore, if any of these types of relief are deemed inadequate or
inappropriate, a court may either allow a shareholder purchase of. the shares
or an involuntary dissolution of the corporation.6 1
All of these types of relief are available in minority shareholder
oppression claims in closely held corporations. 62 This list does in fact
enumerate the types of relief courts have granted to close corporations that
were not created by close corporation statutes. 63 In effect, this list codifies
the remedies available to minority shareholders in closely held corporations
at common law.
One possible difference between a statutory close corporation and a
closely held corporation is that, under the RMBCA, minority shareholders in
statutory close corporations must show that they have exhausted all forms of

59. Forinash,697 S.W.2d at 303-04.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.855 (Supp. 1990).
Id. §§ 351.860-.865.
See generally F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 9, §§ 3:01-:20.
Id.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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nonjudicial remedies before they can file a lawsuit under the oppression
section of the statute. 64 The Missouri Legislature has slightly altered this
section of the RMBCA, however, by only forcing a shareholder to first pursue
those nonjudicial remedies that the shareholder has agreed in writing to pursue
first.6 Consequently, this difference should be slight in Missouri.
Another possible difference is that a statutory close corporation
shareholder is only entitled to relief if a court finds that one of the grounds for
relief listed in the statute exists. 66 These grounds are fraud, oppression,
unfairly prejudicial conduct, deadlock, or grounds for involuntary dissolution
under the general corporation statute.67 The grounds for judicial relief listed
in the statute are not defined further.'
A court therefore faces the same
dilemma with both a statutory close corporation and a closely held corporation
in minority shareholder oppression cases. What constitutes oppressive conduct
towards a minority shareholder? Consequently, this difference between a
statutory close corporation and a closely held corporation is moot.69
IH. FIDucIARY DUTY IN A CLOSE CORPORATION
As the last section pointed out, the label attached to a close corporation
is not important in minority shareholder oppression cases in Missouri. The
important determination is the definition of the term "oppression." Every case
that finds oppression in a corporation, whether close or not, determines that
the fiduciary duty owed to a minority shareholder has been breached.70

Fiduciary duty does not define oppression, though. The fiduciary duty owed
between shareholders may be breached in many different ways. The terms
fraud, oppression, unfairly prejudicial conduct, deadlock, and grounds for

involuntary dissolution in the close corporation statute all involve breaches of

64. See MODEL Acr, supra note 3, commentary at 1854.

65. Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.850.3 (Supp. 1990).
66. Id § 351.855. See also MODEL ACr, supra note 3, commentary at 1853.
67. Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.850 (Supp. 1990).
68. Id.

69. As the comments to the MBCA close corporation supplement point out, "[n]o
attempt has been made to define oppression, fraud, or unfairly prejudicial conduct.
These are elastic terms whose meaning viries with the circumstances presented in a
particular case, and it is felt that existing case law provides sufficient guidelines for
courts and litigants." MODEL Acr, supra note 3, commentary at 1853.
70. See, e.g., Evans v. Blesi, 345 N.W.2d 775, 776 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)
(majority shareholder breached fiduciary duty when "buying out" minority shareholder).https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/3
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fiduciary duties. 7' Therefore, stating that somebody has breached their
fiduciary duty towards a minority shareholder merely begs the question.
One fact is certain. The fiduciary duty means a higher standard of care
in a close corporation than in a public corporation. The cases and commenta-

tors are unanimous in this respect. Being labelled a close corporation by a
court should alert officers, directors and majority shareholders of a corporation
that they are about to hear about their heightened duty towards their minority
shareholders.
This heightened fiduciary duty in a close corporation may range from a
slightly higher duty to that duty to which partners owe each oiler in a
partnership. 2 One Missouri case has stated that "the officers, directors and
controlling shareholders of a 'close' corporation owe a higher degree of
fiduciary duty to minority shareholders than do their counterparts in public
Other cases and commentators have labelled the fiduciary
corporations."'
duty in a close corporation as "very strict." 74 Donahue held that "stockholders in the close corporation owe one another substantially the same fiduciary
duty in the operation of the enterprise that partners owe one another." 75
With the heightened fiduciary duty in a close corporation in mind, the
next step is to define "oppression." The eight areas of oppression discussed
in the next section cover most of the major areas but, are by no means allinclusive.

71. Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.850 (Supp. 1990). See generally Annotation, What
Amounts to "Oppressive" Conduct Under Statute Authorizing Dissolution of
Corporationat Suit of Minority Shareholders,56 A.L.R.3D 358 (1974).
72. For a comprehensive study on the different duties of loyalty in a close
corporation, see Ruder, Duty of Loyalty-A Law Professor'sStatus Report, 40 Bus.

LAW. 1383 (1985).
73. Forinash, 697 S.W.2d at 302-03 (emphasis added).
74. See, e.g., Newton v. Homblower, Inc., 224 Kan. 506, 514, 582 P.2d 1136,
1143 (1978) (actual and punitive damages awarded when directors were engaging in
self-dealing); F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 9, § 7:17.
75. Donahue,367 Mass. at 593, 328 N.E.2d at 515. Accord Alaska Plastics, Inc.
v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 276 (Alaska 1980); Wilkes, 370 Mass. at 848, 353 N.E.2d
at 661.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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IV. TYPES OF MINORITY SHAREHouER OPPRESSION

A. Expectations of a DeclaredDividend or Continued Salary
Dividend withholding is a commonly used "squeeze-out" technique 76 in
a close corporation.' Dividend withholding effectively precludes a minority
shareholder from any return on his or her investment in the corporation. 7
This squeeze-out is accomplished in two ways. First, the corporation will not
7
declare any dividends on the stock or will keep any declared dividends low. V
Second, a minority shareholder who receives compensation as an officer or
director loses the right to receive such compensation.'
Missouri's new close corporation section allows a court to order the
payment of dividends if the court finds the existence of one or more of the
grounds for relief enumerated in the statute.81 Again, one must look to case
law to interpret grounds for relief since oppressive conduct is not defined by
the close corporation section.8
Under the traditional rule, a court will apply the business judgment
rule to determine whether a corporation should pay a dividend on its
stock. 84 A concise statement of the business judgment rule as it pertains to
stock dividends was declared by the Supreme Court of Kansas:
The law gives the majority of the stockholders the right to control the
policy and business of the corporation and the minority must submit to their
decisions when the majority acts in good faith and within their powers....
No principle of law is more firmly fixed in our jurisprudence than the one
which declares that the courts will not interfere in matters involving merely
the judgment of the majority in exercising control over corporate affairs.8

76. "Squeeze out" is a term often used to describe how minority shareholders are
oppressed in a corporation. This term is widely used by courts and commentators to
describe different types of shareholder oppression. See generally F. O'NEAL & R.
THOMPSON, supra note 9, §§ 1:01-:05.
77. Id. § 3:04.

78.
79.
80.
1987).
81.
82.
83.
Section.
84.
85.

Id.
Id.
Id. See generally Whale Art Co. v. Docter, 743 S.W.2d 511 (Mo. Ct. App.
See Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.855(8) (Supp. 1990).
See id. § 351.850.
The business judgment rule is discussed more thoroughly in Part (B) of this
See infra notes 118-39 and accompanying text.
See generally Feess v. Mechanics' St. Bank, 84 Kan. 828, 115 P. 563 (1911).
I1&at 840, 115 P. at 567.
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The business judgment rule receives much closer scrutiny, however, in a close
corporation.'s
Dodge v. Ford Motor CoY is one of the landmark cases where a court
ordered a corporation to declare a dividend on its stock. 88 In Dodge,
squeezing out minority shareholders was not even the primary reason for
withholding dividends."9 The dividends were withheld to allow expansion
of the corporation." The court in Dodge showed its reluctance to interfere
with the business judgment of the corporation regarding expansion, but
declared a "special dividend" on the stock after considering the large profits
of the corporation compared to the reluctance of the corporation to pay out
dividends on its stock in the past.9'
The heightened scrutiny of the business judgment rule in a close

corporation was delineated many years after Dodge in another Michigan case,
Miller v. Maglin4 Inc.92 The minority shareholders in Miller voluntarily left
employment in a close corporation and'successfully sued to have dividends
declared when the close corporation had never before declared dividends on
its stock.93 Miller upheld the trial court's determination that a dividend
should be paid when it held that "[iut is especially true, where one man or
family controls and dominates a corporation, that he, or they, must act in the
utmost good faith in the control and management of the corporation as to
minority stockholders."9

86. See generally Miller v. Magline, Inc., 76 Mich. App. 284, 256 N.W.2d 761
(1977).
87. 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
88. Dodge is cited in almost all casebooks in the section discussing court-ordered
dividend distributions. See, e.g., A. CONARD, R. KNAUSS & S. SIEGEL, CORPORATIONS
80 (2d ed. 1982). The Dodge case is a very interesting history lesson in the struggles
between majority and minority shareholders in a corporation before statutes addressed
the remedies for oppressive conduct. Id. at 83. Dodge involved a power struggle
between Henry Ford, majority shareholder in the Ford Motor Co., and the Dodge
brothers, minority shareholders in the Ford Motor Co. Dodge, 204 Mich. at 459, 170
N.W. at 668. The Dodge brothers eventually left the Ford Motor Co. and formed the
Dodge Motor Co. as a result of the power struggle between them and Henry Ford. See

A.

CONARD

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

R.

KNAUSS & S. SIEGEL,

supra, at 83.

Dodge, 204 Mich. at 508-09, 170 N.W. at 684-85.
Id.
Id.
76 Mich. App. 284, 256 N.W.2d 761 (1977).
Id. at 288, 256 N.W.2d at 761.
Id. at 304, 256 N.W.2d at 769 (quoting F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra

note 9, §§ 8:07-:08).
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A court will often weigh many factors in determining whether a dividend
should be declared.Y Professor O'Neal lists and discusses these factors in
one of his treatises:
(1) amount of surplus in the corporation;
(2) ratio of current assets to current liabilities;
(3) working capital needed by the business;
(4) working capital retained in prior years;
(5) business prospects;
(6) possible future liabilities;
(7) whether a. majority shareholder used his/her controlling position for
his/her own benefit;
(8) any special interests that are not shared by the minority shareholders in
keeping the dividends minimal. 96
These factors need not all be present, just compelling enough for a court to
find oppression and order a dividend payment on the stock. 97
In many close corporations, salaries are paid in lieu of any dividends. 98
This is especially appropriate in small corporations where minority shareholders serve as officers or directors of the corporation or are otherwise entitled
to compensation by the corporation. 9 A cause of action for oppression
arises when a minority shareholder stops receiving a salary because he or she
is either fired or otherwise removed from the corporation."° A court will
more readily allow relief when a minority shareholder largely depends upon
this salary as a primary source of income.' 0 '
The "groundbreaking" case allowing relief where a minority shareholder
has been removed from the payroll is Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home,
Inc."° A minority shareholder who was a former officer and director of a
close corporation was successful in sustaining damages against a corporation
for loss of salary in this Massachusetts case."r
Wilkes realized that a
corporation must "have a large measure of discretion" in the hiring and firing

95. F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 9, § 3:05. See also N. LATrIN, R,
JENNINGS & R. BUXBAUM, CORPORATONS 1363 (4th ed. 1968).
96. F. O'NEAL R. THOMPSON, supra note 9, § 3:05.
97. Id.
98. F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 26, § 1:07.

99. Id.
100. Common fact situations include retirement of an officer or director, widow
of a former officer or director wanting continued compensation, disabling injury to an
officer or director, etc. F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 9, § 3:04.
101. Id. § 3:05.
102. 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976).
103. Id. at 844, 353 N.E.2d at 657.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/3
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of its employees. 1 4 The court found, however, that this particular corporation had violated the "legitimate business purpose" test'0 5 when it terminated
this minority shareholder's employment without cause.'06
Wilkes is a minority view.'" The traditional rule is that officers and
directors can be removed with or without cause and much deference is given
to the business judgment of a corporation with regard to employment."
The traditional remedies available to a wrongfully discharged employee of a
corporation lie under a "breach of employment contract" theory and not under
an oppression claim.'0 9
Missouri has adopted a view similar to the Wilkes court. A shareholder's
expectation of a salary and bonuses was acknowledged in WhaleArt Co., Inc.
v. Docter. ° Whale Art involved a close corporation with three shareholders."' The plaintiff shareholder owned forty-nine percent of the stock while
the two defendant shareholders effectively owned the remaining fifty-one
percent of the stock.lU The corporation had been paying bonuses on a
regular basis as compensation since its incorporation."5 The court in Whale
Art ordered the corporation to continue paying these bonuses even after the
plaintiff left his employment with the corporation." Furthermore, Whale
Art found that the agreement to continue paying bonuses after termination of
employment was based upon an oral contract." 5
Whale Art demonstrates the view that Missouri courts are reluctant to
allow a corporation to squeeze out a minority shareholder by withholding
dividends or by termination of salary. The new close corporation section

104. Id. at 851, 353 N.E.2d at 663.
105. The "legitimate business purpose" test differs from the business judgment
rule. This test is discussed more thoroughly in Part (B) of this Section. See infra
notes 126-34 and accompanying text.
106. Wilkes, 370 Mass. at 852-53, 353 N.E.2d at 663-64. This holding does not
mean that an officer or director can never be dismissed without cause. Many removals
without cause are upheld by the courts. It is only when a removal without cause is a
attempted "squeeze out" of a minority shareholder will the circumstances of an
oppression claim arise. See generally F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 9, §
3:06.
107. Accord Campbell v. Ford Industries, Inc., 274 Ore. 243, 546 P.2d 141
(1976).
108. See generally F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPsON, supra note 9, § 3:06.
109. Id.
110. 743 S.W.2d 511 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
111. Id. at 513.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 515.
115. Id.
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does not specifically list "continued salary" as a type of relief available to an
oppressed minority shareholder." 6 However, it does allude' 7to such relief by
allowing "[t]he award of damages to any aggrieved party.""

B. Business Judgment Rule
The business judgment rule which was briefly discussed in Part (A) of
this Section is a common doctrine used by courts to evaluate the acts of a
board of directors of a corporation. Practically, when a court speaks of the
business judgment rule, the court normally is stating that it will not interfere
with the acts of the board of directors of a corporation. As one Missouri court
has stated:
The management and control of the property and business of a corporation
is vested.., in the Board of Directors, and this has been a fundamental
principle of our statutory corporate law for many years.... The management and control of the corporation being vested by statute in the board of
directors... is not in the stockholders and the actions of the board of
directors in regard to the affairs of the corporation is controlling and
exclusive and the stockholders cannot control the directors in the exercise
of the judgment vested in them by the statute. the function of the board of
directors is to exercise judgment and discretion which the court cannot do
in their stead." 8
The business judgment rule operates on three premises." 9 First, the
directors of a corporation are elected by the shareholders to manage the
corporation and courts should not substitute their judgment for that of
directors selected by the owners (shareholders) of the corporation.'2
Second, the decisions of the board of directors are based upon complex
business considerations and should not be struck down absent a clear abuse
of discretion.2l Third, the rule avoids "strike suits" and other frivolous
litigation by disgruntled shareholders.' 22

116. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.855 (Supp. 1990).
117. Id. § 351.855(9). Section 351.855(1) can also be argued to provide relief in
an employment .contractual setting. It allows a court to order "[t]he performance,
prohibition, alteration, or setting aside of any action of the corporation." Id. §
351.855(1).
118. Saigh v. Busch, 396 S.W.2d 9, 15-16 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965). Accord
Delahoussaye v. Newhard, 785 SAV.2d 609, 613 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
119. See F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 26, § 1:19.

120. Id.
121. Id
122. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/3
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While these three justifications hold true for most corporations, they seem
to "break down" somewhat in a close corporation setting. As a result, many
courts and commentators criticize a strict application of the business judgment
rule to close corporations.r
Professor O'Neal criticizes these three

justifications:
These justifications for the business judgment rule, however, do not apply
in all their vigor to a close corporation .... Participants in a close
corporation do not usually think of themselves as delegating management

of their corporation to an independent board of directors; the board is often
viewed as only a legal formality. Insofar as the participants at the time
they organize a close corporation look into the future; they usually
anticipate that the owners will also be the managers and minority sharehold124
ers often expect to share in management.
Many courts have fashioned an alternative to the per se approach of the
business judgment rule. This alternative is known as the "legitimate business
purpose" test."25 Under this test, when a business purpose is asserted by the
majority (or those in control of a corporation), minority shareholders can
demonstrate that "the same legitimate objective could have been achieved
through an alternative course of action less harmful to the minority's
interest."' 2 Missouri courts have not yet used the "legitimate business
purpose" test for close corporations.'2 7
The new close corporation section
itself does not give any insight into whether to use the business judgment rule
or the "legitimate business purpose" test"'2
The "legitimate business
purpose" test was rejected specifically in favor of the traditional business
judgment rule in the most recent Missouri close corporation case.2 9
However, the recent enactment of the new close corporation section 30 and
the growing trend to avoid the harshness of the per se traditional business
judgment rule in a close corporation setting 3' may influence future Missouri

123. Id. See generally Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278 (Del.
1977); Donahue,367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505.
124. F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 9, § 1:19.
125. See Schwartz v. Marien, 37 N.Y.2d 487, 335 N.E.2d 334, 373 N.Y. Supp.
122 (1975) (leading New York case on this alternative test).
126. Wilkes, 370 Mass. at 851-52, 353 N.E.2d at 663.
127. See, e.g., Delahoussaye, 785 S.W.2d at 612; Herbik, 732 S.W.2d at 235;
Saigh, 396 S.W.2d at 15-16.
128. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 351.850-.855 (Supp. 1990).
129. Delahoussaye, 785 S.W.2d at 612.
130. Delahoussaye was decided on January 16, 1990. The new corporation
section was enacted during July of 1990.
131. See generally F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPsON, supra note 9, § 3:06.
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courts to adopt the more flexible "legitimate business purpose" approach.
Georgia, one of the states that has also adopted the close corporation section
of the RMBCA,132 has specifically applied the "legitimate business purpose"
13
test. 1

The business judgment rule and the "legitimate business purpose" test can
Common fact situations include
arise in innumerable fact situations.'
when a minority shareholder is removed as an officer, director or other
employee of a close corporation; 5 when redemption rights are exercised
under a redemption agreement;'6 when the bylaws or articles of incorporation are amended; 37 attempted merger with another corporation;138 and
when dividends are not declared on the stock. 9 Officers, directors and
majority shareholders of close corporations must realize that their action will
be scrutinized more carefully under either test because of the inherent
characteristics of a close corporation.
C. Diverting CorporateFunds
Diverting corporate funds can constitute oppression in many cases. The
two most common scenarios are when corporate funds are diverted for the
personal use of officers, directors or majority shareholders 40 and when the

real or personal property of the close corporation is transferred to an officer,

132. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-2-901 to -2-950 (1990).
133. See Corbin v. Corbin, 429 F. Supp. 276 (M.D. Ga. 1977) (majority
shareholder diverted corporate funds to buy three luxury automobiles and to furnish
corporate office at home).
134. Almost every case containing an oppression claim speaks of one or both of
these tests.
135. Green v. SantaFe Industries, Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976) (reviewing
Delaware corporate law); Corbin, 429 F. Supp. 276 (M.D. Ga. 1977) (applying
Georgia law); Wilkes, 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976) (applying Massachusetts
law). See supra notes 100-17 and accompanying text.
136. Alcott v. Hyman, 42 Del. Ch. 233, 208 A.2d 501 (1965) (corporation can
exercise redemption rights if there will be no impairment of capital).
137. 12B W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORA71ONS
§ 5824 (rev. perm. ed. 1984) (amendments of corporate charter); F. O'NEAL & R.
THOMPSON, supra note 9, § 5:09 (amending the charter and bylaws-a "squeeze-out"
technique).
138. F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 9, §§ 5:04-:08 (squeeze-outs through
mergers).
139. See supra notes 77-117 and accompanying text.
140. Corbin v. Corbin, 429 F. Supp. 276 (M.D. Ga. 1977); Alaska Plastics Inc.
v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270 (Alaska 1980).
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director or majority shareholder.14 '
Officers, directors and majority
shareholders should be careful not to violate either the business judgment rule
or the "legitimate business purpose" test discussed in Part (B) of this
section 4 2 when attempting to transfer corporate property to a member of the
close corporation.
A classic case of diverting corporate funds for the personal use of a
majority shareholder in a close corporation occurred in a federal diversity
case 43 in Georgia, Corbin v. Corbin.'44 The majority shareholder in
Corbin diverted corporate funds to purchase three luxury automobiles in his
name and to spend a large sum of money to furnish one of his rooms at his
condominium as an office for use at night. 45 The majority shareholder also
made a large cash advaance of corporate funds to himself while tle plaintiff
minority shareholder only received a small cash advance.' 46 Corbin found
that this pattern of diverting corporate funds was an attempt to "freeze out" the
plaintiff minority shareholder and issued injunctive relief to prevent further
use of corporate funds for the personal use of the majority shareholder. 47
While Corbin is an obvious case of diverting corporate funds, other more
subtle fact situations can constitute oppression. This was the case in Alaska
Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock.' s In Alaska Plastics, the court determined that
certain director's fees were excessive and constituted constructive dividends. 49 While the fees were not exorbitant, the court seemed swayed by
the fact that the plaintiff minority shareholder never received any money from
the corporation. 5 0 Alaska Plastics was remanded for a determination of
damages to the minority shareholder. 5 '

141. 12B W. FLETCHER, supra note 137, § 5828 (transfers of corporate property).
142. See supra notes 118-39 and accompanying text.
143. The plaintiff was a resident of Jacksonville, Florida while the defendant was
a resident of Macon, Georgia. Corbin, 429 F. Supp. at 277.
144. 429 F. Supp. 276 (M.D. Ga. 1977). This case was decided before Georgia
adopted the same RMBCA close corporation section adopted by Missouri but Georgia
law was applied since the corporation was from Georgia and added as a party
defendant. Id. at 277.
145. The majority shareholder bought an Eldorado Cadillac, a Fleetwood Cadillac
and a Lincoln Continental. The home office costs were $8,500. Id. at 278.
146. The majority shareholder received $37,341 while the plaintiff received

$2,836. Id. at 279.
147. Id. at 283.
148. 621 P.2d 270 (Alaska 1980).
149. Id. at 276..
150. Id. at 272.
151. Id. at 278.
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Alaska Plasticsraises another potential "pitfall" for officers and directors
of a close corporation. Under the federal tax laws, excessive salaries may be
construed as constructive dividends for purposes of calculating the recipient's
gross income. 5 2 A close corporation will not be able to avoid tax liability
by dispensing large salaries since such disguised dividends are not deductible
by the corporation."'
A close corporation should be careful to make director's and officer's
salaries reasonably related to the value of the services they render to the
corporation. Also, officers and directors should not receive substantial
increases in salaries without either a dividend distribution or some other form
of compensation increase to minority shareholders. The holding of Whale
ArtP reminds the reader that a minority shareholder may have an expectation of continued salary or bonuses."5
Likewise, transfers of corporate stock can constitute oppression. The new
close corporation section requires that "[a] person desiring to transfer shares
of a statutory close corporation . . . shall first offer them to the corporation."'56 This section prevents fraudulent conveyances of shares of officers,
directors and majority shareholders to third persons such as spouses, other
relatives, and the like. Any attempt to transfer shares in a statutory close
corporation that violates the articles of incorporation, the bylaws of the close
corporation, or the close corporation section is ineffective." 7
"Ultra vires" is a common law cause of action also brought by a minority
shareholder to prevent a fraudulent transfer of corporate property.5 8
Common fact situations of ultra vires transfers occur when there is an illegal
or fraudulent assignment in contemplation of insolvency; sale or lease of all
corporate property and abandonment of the corporate business; and transfer of

the corporate property to third persons.' 59 However, a minority shareholder

152. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-8 (1960).
153. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(1)-(3) (1960).
154. Whale Art Co. v. Docter, 743 S.W.2d 511 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
155. See supra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
156. Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.770 (Supp. 1990).
157. Id. § 351.775.
158. "Ultra vires" literally means "beyond the powers" of the corporation. It
pertains to acts that are beyond the authorization of the articles of incorporation and
the bylaws of a corporation. See R. JENNINGS & R. BUXBAUM, CORPORATIONS 116
(5th ed. 1979).
159. See 12B W. FLETCHER, supra note 137, § 5828 and annotated cases.
Fraudulent and illegal transfers in contemplation of insolvency can also bring up
certain sections of the bankruptcy code. For a Missouri case dealing with the transfer
of corporate property to third persons, see Forinash v. Daugherty, 697 S.W.2d 294
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (director selling stock to third person and giving up control of
corporation).
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can be prevented from bringing an ultra vires cause of action through the
doctrine of laches.'"
An aggrieved minority shareholder has several grounds for relief for the
wrongful diversion of corporate funds under Missouri's new close corporation
section.'
The court can prohibit or set aside the transaction,
remove
a director or officer,'63 order an accounting with respect to the transaction,' 6 appoint a custodian to manage the corporation,'6 or award
damages to the minority shareholder.'6 All of these types of relief were
also available to an aggrieved minority shareholder before the new close
corporation section was enacted.' 67
D. Disclosureof Information
An important way to avoid a minority shareholder oppression claim is to
disclose all pertinent information to minority shareholders. Many squeeze-outs
involve the deliberate withholding of information from the minority shareholder. 168 Squeeze-outs are, in effect, much easier to accomplish if certain
information is withheld. 69 Difficulties occur in differentiating between
70
information that must be disclosed and information that may be withheld.
The Supreme Court of Delaware in Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp."
fashioned a workable standard for the disclosure of information, which could
be called the "germane facts" test."7 The court in Lynch had to determine
whether the directors of a corporation disclosed enough information to a
minority shareholder before accepting a tender offer for its stock. 73 Lynch

160. See 12B W. FLETCHER, supra note 137, § 5828. "Laches" depends both
upon reliance and a lapsed period of time.
161. Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.855 (Supp. 1990).
162. Id. § 351.855(1).
163. Id. § 351.855(3).
164. Id. § 351.855(5).
165. Id. § 351.855(6).

166. Id. §351.855(9). These types of relief are not the only ones available. They
are probably just'the most appropriate types of relief in these situations.
167. See generally F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 9, §§ 3:01-:20.
168. See generally id. §§ 3:09-:11.
169. Id.
170. ld.
171. 383 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. 1977), overruled on other grounds,Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703-04 (Del. 1983).
172. While Lynch did not involve a close corporation, the test is certainly useful
for close corporations. Id. at 279.
173. Id. at 281.
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stated that the directors of a corporation must disclose "all information in their
possession germane to the transaction in issue. And by 'germane' we mean,
for present purposes, information such as a reasonable shareholder would
17 4
consider important in deciding whether to sell or retain stock."'
The "germane facts" test is most useful in situations such as Lynch where

there is a tender offer or a merger attempt 75 or where the close corporation

itself is purchasing a minority shareholder's stock. 7 6 Attempted mergers or
acquisitions of another corporation's stock are also subject to special rules
under the new close corporation section if the status of the corporation as a
statutory close corporation will be affected by such transactions.'"
Missouri has an interesting case dealing with burden of proof and
disclosure of information when a majority shareholder purchases corporate
property. In Simpson v. Spellman,'" the court discussed the former Missouriperse rule prohibiting directors from conducting personal transactions with

their own corporation.'7 The new "burden of proof' rule outlined by
Simpson states that "a director may conduct personal transactions with his
corporation if he can prove that he has not gained unconscionable or secret
profits in the transaction and that he has dealt openly, honestly, and fairly with

174. Id.
175. Mergers should never be attempted without full disclosure of the action to
minority shareholders. See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988)
(action brought to set aside merger under Rule 10b-5); Michaels v. Michaels, 767 F.2d
1185 (7th Cir. 1985) (action brought to set aside merger under Rule 10b-5), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1057 (1986).
176. Kansas has much case law on the fiduciary duty of full disclosure when
purchasing stock from a minority shareholder. See, e.g., Delano v. Kitch, 663 F.2d
990, 995 (10th Cir. 1981) (under Kansas law, directors and officers must make full
disclosure before buying or selling stock from or to shareholders), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 946 (1982); Sampson v. Hunt, 222 Kan. 268, 269-71, 564 P.2d 489, 490-91
(1977) (agreement to buy minority shareholder's stock was set aside when value was
substantially less than true value); Stewart v. Harris, 69 Kan. 498, 499-502, 77 P. 277,
278-79 (1904) (transaction set aside where president of bank purchased shares at much
less than actual value).
For an extensive analysis of the duty to disclose information when purchasing a
minority shareholder's stock, see Annotation, Duty and Liability of Closely Held
Corporation,Its Directors,Officers, or Majority Stockholders, in Acquiring Stock of
Minority Shareholder, 7 A.L.R.3D 500 (1966).
177. See generally Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.830 (Supp. 1990).
178. 522 S.W.2d 615 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
179. Id. at 619-20. The original rule was that "any transaction in which a director
of a corporation purchased corporate property was constructively fraudulent." Id. at
619. The new rule governing this particular topic is codified at Mo. REV. STAT. §
351.327 (Supp. 1991).
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The words "secret" and "openly"
the corporation and the stockholders."1
suggest that a standard such as the "germane facts" test would be appropriate
in evaluating such a transaction in Missouri.
The new close corporation statute affords many grounds for relief when
a minority shareholder discovers that an officer, director or minority
shareholder is withholding germane information81 l One of the most useful
grounds for relief in such a situation is a court-ordered "accounting" with
respect to the suspect transaction. 82 Of course, the reader should readily
ask how a minority shareholder will learn about a suspect transaction if
information is withheld in the first place.183
Another important area dealing with the disclosure of information is the
minority shareholder's right to inspect the corporate books. Missouri, Is 4 and
most states,'8s regulated this right by statute. This section of the corporation
statute is contained in the general corporation law, is6 but applies to the close
corporation section.' 7 Under this section, the corporation must keep correct
and complete records of meetings and accounts at its registered office or its
principal place of business.lss These records must contain all pertinent
information dealing with the shares of the corporation.8 9 Every shareholder
has the right to inspect the corporate books in accordance with the bylaws of
the corporation. 19° Regardless of the bylaws, a shareholder may also inspect

180. Simpson, 522 S.W.2d at 619-20 (emphasis added).
181. See generally Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 351.855-.865 (Supp. 1990).
182. Id. § 351.855(5). .
183. This statement is not meant to suggest that information should be withheld
to avoid an oppression claim by a minority shareholder. The best standard to follow
is the "germane facts" test.
184. Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.215 (1986).

185. Nearly every state provides for a shareholder's right to inspect the corporate
books. See appropriate state corporation statute for verification.
186. Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.215 (1986).

187. "The provisions of this chapter [general corporation law] apply to statutory
close corporations to the extent not inconsistent with the provisions of sections 351.750
to 351.865 [close corporation section]." Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.750 (Supp. 1990).
188. Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.215.1 (1986). An agent of the corporation in
Missouri can keep the corporate books if a registered office or principal place of
business is not located in Missouri. Id.
189. Information included must be "the number of shares subscribed, the names,
of the owners of the shares, the numbers owned by them respectively, the amount of
shares paid, and by whom, and the transfer of such shares with the date of transfer."
id.
190. Id.
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the corporate books upon written notice'if the shareholder has a "reasonable
1 91
and proper purpose.'

A close corporation should allow a shareholder to inspect the corporate
books without forcing the shareholder to obtain a court order showing that he
or she has a reasonable and proper purpose. Oppression cases exist where
minority sharqholders are effectively squeezed out by delays in legal
processes."2
The Missouri corporation section regulating the inspection of the
corporate books specifically requires that the "corporation shall keep correct
and complete books."''1 This suggests that close corporations should hold
meaningful corporate meetings with officer, director, and shareholder
participation where minutes are taken carefully."
A close corporation
should also make sure that the officers of the corporation make out reports of
any actions they may be called on to perform at corporate meetings. 195
Close corporations should also voluntarily disclose all germane
information to minority shareholders regardless of whether such information
is available in the corporate books.'9 The duty to disclose information to
minority shareholders is not discharged by the fact that such information could
be obtained from inspecting the corporate booksY9
E. Loans of CorporateFunds
The loaning of corporate funds is closely related to diverting corporate
assets to officers, directors, or majority shareholders in a close corporation. 98 Loans to corporate members are suspect when they are accompanied
by little or no interest and the recipient provides little or no security for the
loan. 199

191. Id. The fine for refusing to allow a shareholder to inspect the corporate
books is two-hundred fifty dollars per offense. Id. § 351.215.2.
192. See generallyF. O'NEAL &R. THOMPSON, supra note 9, § 6:01 (using legal
processes as a squeeze-out technique).
193. Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.215.1 (1986).
194. See generally F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 9, § 6:02 (maneuvers
related to corporate meetings)..
195. Id. See also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985) (board
of directors failed to disclose all material facts before securing shareholder's approval
of merger)..
196. Actual knowledge is normally easier to prove and weighs more heavily
against a minority shareholder than constructive knowledge.
197. See Annotation, supra note 176, at 503-04.
198. See generally F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 9, § 3:12.
199. Id. For an interesting Kansas case where a corporate loan was given in lieu
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Missouri's general corporation statute strictly prohibits a corporation from
loaning any shareholder money to pay for "any part of any share or shares,"
regardless of whether the loan is secured by a deed of trust, a mortgage, or
otherwise. ° All shares of stock in Missouri must be paid for with legal
consideration. 2° Legal consideration is money, labor, or property actually
received, which excludes promissory notes and future services. 2 These
rules also apply to the new close corporation section. 203
The general corporation statute in Missouri is silent as to loans to its
members for purposes other than to acquire corporate stock. 2' Many states
only allow a corporation to lend money to a member of a corporation when
the loan is reasonably expected to benefit the corporation in the judgment of
the directors. 2 5 This stricter view on the loaning of corporate funds should
be sufficient to protect officers, directors, and majority shareholders of close
corporations in Missouri who wish to obtain loans of corporate assets. These
precautions on loans also encompass a loan given to another corporation in
which an officer, director, or majority shareholder of the lending corporation
has a substantial financial or personal interest. 2w
The words "judgment of the directors" contained in many state statutes
on corporate loans contemplate that a court will evaluate such a loan using the
business judgment rule instead of the stricter "legitimate business purpose"
test. Consequently, directors of close corporations should be aware of the
differences between these two rules as discussed in Part (B) of this section. 2° In both instances, any corporate loan should be secured by a deed
of trust, a mortgage, or other adequate security.2
Corporate loans given to a close corporation by an officer, director, or
majority shareholder may be suspect if they are secured by a mortgage or deed
of trust. The mortgage or deed or trust may be placed upon corporate
property with a view towards foreclosure. 209 This may have the effect of a

of a salary to avoid paying income taxes, see Oberhelman v. Barnes Inv. Corp., 236
Kan. 335, 336-37, 690 P.2d 1343, 1345-46 (Kan. 1984).
200. Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.165 (1986).
201. Id. § 351.160.
202. Id.
203. Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.750 (Supp. 1990).
204. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 351 (1986).
205. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6303 (1988). Kansas has adopted the

Delaware corporate law virtually verbatim, as have many states.
206. See generally F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 9, § 3:12 (siphoning
off corporate earnings by favorable loans and leases).

207. See supra notes 118-39 and accompanying text.
208. See generally F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 9, § 3:12 n.16.
209. See 12B W. FLETCHER, supra note 137, § 5830.
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fraudulent transfer of corporate real property to a member of the close
corporation as discussed in Part (C) of this section210 and may constitute
oppression.2

F. Issuing New Shares of Stock, Recapitalizationand
Changing Stated Capital
The questions of whether new shares of stock can be issued or whether
stated capital can be increased or decreased are first addressed by looking to
the articles of incorporation and bylaws of a close corporation.2 2 Missouri's general corporation statute also sets out initial guidelines for numbers
of shares and stated capital.2' However, the rules set forth by the general
statute and the articles of incorporation and bylaws of a close corporation may
be of no effect to prevent such actions in a close corporation. This problem
arises when a majority shareholder holds enough voting stock to do either of
these actions without the approval of the minority shareholders.2 4
Oppression claims arise when new shares of stock are issued or stated
capital is increased in order to squeeze-out a minority shareholder. 215 Any
attempted exercise of these two actions should not violate the "legitimate
business purpose" test discussed in Part (B) of this section.216
Recapitalization is another squeeze-out technique.2 7 Recapitalization
may allow officers, directors or majority shareholders "to strengthen their
control of a corporation or to facilitate their purchase of additional voting

210. See supra notes 156-67 and accompanying text.
211. See, e.g., Gunderson v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 199 M1.422, 65 N.E.
326 (1902) (foreclosure on mortgaged corporate property set aside for fraud).
212. The number of shares and amount of stated capital can be further restricted
from the statutory guidelines in the articles of incorporation and the bylaws of the
corporation. See generally Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 351.180-.200 (1986).
213. Id.
214. The articles of incorporation of the bylaws of a corporation may allow for
a new issuance of stock or a change in stated capital with a certain percentage of
shareholder approval. A majority shareholder who owns more that this percentage can
virtually exercise any of these actions on her own. The majority shareholder will still
be subject to the statutory rules. Id.
215. See generally F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 9, §§ 5:09-:12.
216. The "legitimate business purpose" test is stricter than the business judgment
rule. Therefore, any action should be safe legally if this test is followed. See supra
notes 118-39 and accompanying text.
217. See F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 9, § 5:13.
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stock."21 The same standards applicable to the issuance of new shares of
stock will apply to recapitalization.219
An oppression claim also may be raised by a minority shareholder under

certain circumstances where the stated capital is reduced.m

A close

corporation effectively can raise the voting power of a majority shareholder
by reducing the stated capital in some cases.?'1 The reduction of stated
capital is strictly governed in Missouri by the general corporation statutem
which is applicable to the new close corporation section.?
G. Usurping a Business Opportunity of the Corporation
The usurping of a corporate opportunity is another commonly used
squeeze-out technique.224 This situation occurs when an officer, director or
majority shareholder personally seizes a corporate opportunity that shouldbelong tothe corporation.? Often, the person seizing a corporate opportunity will form a new corporation to exploit the-seized opportunity. 226 In the
oft-quoted case of Guth v. Loft, Inc.,227 a Delaware court described the duty
owed to a corporation when a business opportunity arises:
Corporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their position of
trust and confidence to further their private interests. While technically not
trustees, they stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its
stockholders. A public policy, existing through the years, and derived from

218. Id.
219. See id. §§ 5:12-:13.
220. IiL § 5:14.
221. See, e.g., Godley v. Crandall & Godley Co., 212 N.Y. 121, 105 N.E. 818
(1914) (corporation not allowed to reduce stated capital and turn over shares without
compensation to new corporation in order to dissolve existing corporation).
222. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.195 (1986).
223. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.750 (Supp. 1990).
224. See generally F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 9, § 3:18.
225. Id.
226. Id. See, e.g., Samia v. Central Oil Co., 339 Mass. 101, 158 N.E.2d 469
(1959).
227. 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (1939). Like Dodge, Guth is another
interesting history lesson in the power struggles between officers, directors and
shareholders. Loft, Inc., the aggrieved corporation in Guth, was an exclusive CocaCola distributor. When Coca-Cola refused to give Loft, Inc. a discount, the
corporation began to look towards the Pepsi-Cola Co. Mr. Guth, the president of Loft,

Inc., then seized the Pepsi-Cola opportunity for himself. Guth, 23 Del. Ch. at 259-60,
5 A.2d at 505-06. This was probably the advent of the "Cola Wars." See also R.
JENNINGs & R. BUXBAUM, supra note 158, at 498.
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a profound knowledge of human characteristics and motives, has established
a rule that demands of a corporate officer or director, peremptorily and
inexorably, the most scrupulous observance of his [her] duty, not only
affirmatively to protect the interests of the corporation committed to his
[her] charge, but also to refrain from doing anything that would work injury
to the corporation, or to deprive it of profit or advantage which his [her]
skill and ability might properly bring to it, or to enable it to make in the
reasonable and lawful exercise of its powers. The rule that requires an
undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation
demands that there shall
8
be no conflict between duty and self-interest.2
Guth formulated a "fairness"test to determine the possible existence of a
corporate opportunity."' This fairness test is the one most often used by
courts today.uo This test has been modified by the Delaware courts to
contain four elements to determine whether a corporate opportunity exists: (1)
"the 'interest or expectancy' test, also called the 'essential' test; (2) the 'line
of business' test; (3) the 'practical advantage' test; and (4) the 'use of
corporate resources' test.""ul
The "interest or expectancy" test depends upon whether the opportunity
is essential to the corporation and whether the corporation would expect to
seize the opportunity if presented with it.232 This test can be negated if the
3
corporation is presented with the opportunity and rejects it.1
The "line of business" test depends on whether the opportunity embraces
an activity which the corporation "has fundamental knowledge, practical
experience and ability to pursue, which, logically and naturally, is adaptable
to its business having regard for its financial position, and is one that is
consonant with its reasonable needs and aspirations for expansion.""u4 This
test takes both current business and future reasonable expansion possibilities
into account.
The "practical advantage" and "use of corporate resources" tests are
basically self-explanatory. Would the opportunity serve a practical advantage

228. Guth, 23 Del. Ch. at 270, 5 A.2d at 510.
229. Id. at 270-279, 5 A.2d at 510-513.
230. Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 967 (Del. Ch. 1985). The other two
commonly-used tests are the "expectancy" test and the "line of business" test. Id.
These two tests have now been combined with the fairness test to formulate an overall
test. Id at 968.
231. Id. See also R. JENNINGs & R. BuxrAUM, supra note 158, at 497-99.
232. Lewis, 502 A.2d at 968.
233. Id.
234. Guth, 23 Del. Ch. at 279, 5 A.2d at 514.
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to the corporation and were corporate assets used by a member of the
corporation to acquire the opportunity?m5
Samia v. CentralOil Co.2 6 represents a case where a group of majority
shareholders usurped a business opportunity and started a new corporation to
exploit that opportunity. The majority shareholders in Samia even siphoned7
off funds from the existing corporation to establish the new corporation.2
Samia ordered the majority shareholders -to transfer some stock in the new
corporation to their former minority shareholders in an amount equal to the
former minority shareholders' interests.m
A similar issue arises when an officer, director or majority shareholder
competes in an independent competitive business. In Gottlieb v. McKee, 9
a Delaware court was faced with such a fact situation. The directors of the
corporation in Gottliebmade certain investments in another corporation which

brought about the lawsuit.'

Gottlieb refused to grant the directors summa-

241
ry judgment with regard to whether a corporate opportunity existed.
Whether a member of a corporation can invest in another corporation depends
heavily on the "line of business" test.u 2 If the two corporations are in the
243
same line of business, they are competing corporations.
Again, the usurping of a business opportunity is not explicitly listed as
a grounds for relief under Missouri's new close corporation section. 244 An
oppression claim would surely arise, though, under one of the general
definitions listed in the appropriate statute.2 5

H.

General Treatment of Minority Shareholders

The general treatment of minority shareholders can also be called
minority shareholder "etiquette" or "courtesy." The following paragraphs in
this sub-section describe some minor things that officers, directors, and

235. Lewis, 502 A.2d at 969-70.
236. 339 Mass. 101, 158 N.E.2d 469 (1959).
237. Id.at 106-07, 158 N.E.2d at 473.
238. Id.at 130, 158 N.E.2d at 486.
239. 34 Del. Ch. 537, 107 A.2d 240 (1954).
240. 1& at 539, 107 A.2d at 241.
241. Id. at 546, 107 A.2d at 245.
242. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
243. Gottlieb, 34 Del. Ch. at 543, 107 A.2d at 244. See also 3 W. RFLTCHER,
supra note 137, § 862 (usurpation of a corporate opportunity).
244. See generally Mo. REV.STAT. § 351.850 (Supp. 1990).
245. Some of these grounds are "illegal, oppressive, fraudulent, or unfairly
prejudicial" conduct as discussed in Section HI of this Comment. Id. See also supra
notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
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majority shareholders can do to avoid provoking a minority shareholder into
filing an oppression claim. While these suggestions may sound trivial, they
require virtually no effort and commonly fall into that often avoided category
called "common sense."2 6 Some of these suggestions are mandated also by
statute. 7
Minority shareholders should be invited to all annual shareholder
meetings with sufficient notice.'
The new close corporation section sets
the annual meeting date for a statutory close corporation as "the first business
day after May thirty-first unless its articles of incorporation, bylaws, or a
shareholder agreement... fixes a different date."' 9 An annual meeting for
a statutory close corporation can also be waived unless one or more shareholders request a meeting by written notice to the corporation.2'
If an annual meeting is held, the general corporation statute requires that
written notice be given to all shareholders entitled to vote at the meeting. 25
This notice must be given either personally or by mall to each voting
shareholder between ten and fifty days before the meeting. 2 2 The notice

must contain the place, day and hour of the meeting.2'
Special meetings are meetings other than the scheduled annual meetings.
If a special meeting is called, the notice to each voting shareholder must also
list the purposes of the meeting.'
Special meetings should not be called
at an inconvenient time or place for minority shareholders if a convenient time
and place is available. 5 Also, a minority shareholder should be allowed
to call a special meeting in accordance with the bylaws of a corporation. 6
Conduct at shareholder meetings is important. Close corporation
shareholder meetings should be meaningful with officer, director and
shareholder participation. 27 One officer should not be able to dictate the

246. It should seem apparent to the reader at this point that many oppression
claims could be avoided if the minority shareholder is content with the oferations of
the corporation. This piece of the Comment is geared towards the "little things" that
should ensure a smooth relationship with minority shareholders.
247. See generally Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 351-59 (1986).
248. See id. §§ 351.225-.230.
249. Mo. REv.

STAT.

§ 351.815.1 (Supp. 1990).

250. Id. § 351.815.2.
251. Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.230.1 (1986).
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id
255. See generally F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 9, § 6:02 (maneuvers
related to corporate meetings).
256. Id.
257. Id.
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conduct of the other officers to the point where the other officers have no say
in corporate matters."
Whale Art, discussed in Part (A) of this section,"' referred to a
shareholder's expectation of continued salary or bonuses. ° A related
concern deals with pension or profit-sharing plans in a close corporation. A
close corporation should exercise extreme care when attempting to extinguish
a minority shareholder's right to an existing pension or profit-sharing
plan. 61 A minority shareholder in an oppression case in Minnesota was
awarded extensive punitive damages when his benefits from a close corporation were extinguished. 2
One final interesting oppression case is another
Minnesota case25
4
treatises.Y
his
of
one
reported by Professor O'Neal in
Majority shareholders, it was said, openly treated the minority shareholders
with hostility and disrespect, refusing to discuss company affairs with the
minority or to disclose to the minority information on the business. They
dismissed with contempt minority suggestions for improving or developing
the business, although one minority member was the company's executive
vice-president and another was a member of the board of directors. In
order to discourage minority directors from continuing to serve on the
board, the majority terminated the corporation's traditional policy of paying
fees to directors. Some of the majority shareholders refused to speak to the
company's executive vice-president even though their offices were located
near one another. On one occasion in the presence of company employees,
the company's president, a member of the majority, stuck out his tongue
and thumbed his nose at the executive vice-president. On another occasion,
while a minority director was making a presentation to the board, the
president gave out contemptuous grunts, made faces, and rudely read
publications and otherwise busied himself. The president refused minority
officers the use of company offices they had long occupied, demanding the
return of keys and changing locks on office doors; he cancelled their credit
cards without explanation; and he refused them the customary use of

258. See, e.g., Sheehy v. Barry, 87 Conn. 656, 89 A. 256 (1914) (suit brought to
dissolve corporation for mismanagement); Helfman v. American Light & Traction Co.,
121 N.J. Eq. 1, 187 A. 540 (N.J. Ch. 1936) (corporation deemed to be alter-ego of one
of the directors).
259. See supra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
260. 743 S.W.2d at 511.
261. See, e.g., Evans v. Blesi, 345 N.W.2d 775 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
262. Id. at 777. The trial court awarded $500,000 in punitive damages which was
reduced to $250,000 in the court of appeals. Id.
263. The case was settled without litigation so it is not reported. See F. O'NEAL
& R. THOMPSON, supra note 9, § 6:09 n.28.
264. Id. § 6:09.
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company cars. He instructed company employees to deliver all mail
addressed to minority officers to another company officer for inspection and
"screening." As part of a scheme to humiliate the executive vice-president
and destroy his morale, majority shareholders tried to force him to move to
a distant state by assigning to him the responsibility for managing for the
company in that state a line of products in which the majority shareholders
knew he had no confidence, a line of products which they knew was
failing and which in fact did fail. As a crowning insult, majority shareholders caused the corporation not to invite minority shareholder-employees to
the annual Old-Timers Party held on the 75th Anniversary of the company,
although they had attended similar functions in the past and one of them
had been with the company longer than any other employee. Finally,
although outsiders make a cash offer to purchase all the corporation's stock
on exceedingly favorable terms, majority shareholders summarily rejected
the offer.6
This case illustrates that minority shareholders may be provoked into filing an
oppression claim when treated rudely by the hierarchy of a close corporation.
It also demonstrates that many different acts by officers, directors or majority
shareholders can add up to a viable oppression claim.
V. SUGGESTIONS TO AVOID AN OPPRESSION CLAIM
The following list is a summary of Section IV of this Comment. The
footnote to each suggestion provides a quick reference to that part of Section
IV which lists and discusses cases and commentaries supporting the suggestion. This list should provide corporate attorneys with an easy checklist for
locating and attempting to avoid possible oppression claims when dealing with
a close corporation client. Copies of this list could also be given to close
corporation clients as a means of preventive law. Again, this list will err on
the side of cautiousness since an oppression claim can arise from a myriad of
fact situations.'
1. Have an honest, discretionary reason for not declaring dividends on
the stock.6 7
2. Declare a dividend on the stock when the equities of the close
corporation indicate that a dividend is feasible.m
3. Make sure that declared dividends are not sufficiently low enough
that they will be de minimis.6'

265. Ild
266. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 77-97 and accompanying text.
269. Id.
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4. Provide salaries, bonuses or other compensation on a regular basis
if compensation is given in lieu of declared dividends.270
5. Show extreme care when terminating a minority shareholder's
compensation if the minority shareholder depends largely upon this compensation to maintain a certain standard of living. 7'
6. Have a legitimate business purpose for removing a minority
shareholder as an officer, director or employee of the close corporation.'m
7. Have a legitimate business purpose for exercising any redemption
rights under a redemption agreement. 3
8. Have a legitimate business purpose for amending the bylaws or
articles of incorporation of the close corporation. 274
9. Do not attempt a merger with
another corporation without a
275
legitimate business purpose for doing so.
10. Make sure that a legitimate business purpose for any corporate action
is not outweighed by a legitimate purpose which is less harmful to a minority
shareholder's interest.276
11. Do not divert corporate funds for the personal use of an officer,
27
director or majority shareholder of the close corporation.
12. Make the salaries of members of the close corporation reasonably
related to the value of the services they render to the corporation. 278
13. Do not substantially increase the salaries of officers, directors or
majority shareholders to the exclusion of minority shareholders.27 9
14. Do not transfer title to corporate real or personal property without
legal consideration.?o
15. Offer shares of the close corporation to members of the corporation
before attempting to transfer the shares to third persons. 28'
16. Do not perform any acts that are beyond the powers vested by the
bylaws and articles of incorporation of the close corporation. 2

270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

See supra notes 98-117 and accompanying text.
Id.
See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 140-51 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 148-55 and accompanying text.
Id.
See supra notes 156-57, 207-11 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
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17. Voluntarily disclose any information that may not be available to a
minority shareholder which may affect the value of the minority shareholder's
stock which becomes available to an officer, director or majority shareholder
by virtue of their position.
18. Inform minority shareholders if the availability of additional
financing for the close corporation arises.
19. Inform minority shareholders of the existence of any favorable
contracts that may come before the close corporation.
20. Inform minority shareholders of any new business prospects.2
21. Inform minority shareholders of any possible plans by an officer,
director or majority shareholder to dispose of all or part of their interest in the
close corporation in the near future.287
22. Inform minority shareholders of any tender offer or any other type
of offer to purchase stock from the close corporation before acting on the
offer.M
23. Fully inform a minority shareholder of all germane facts concerning
the close corporation before attempting to purchase his or her stock.2 9
24. Voluntarily disclose to the minority shareholders any preliminary
merger talks with another corporation.'

25." Voluntarily disclose any other germane facts to the minority
shareholders. Germane facts are facts that a reasonable shareholder would
consider important in deciding whether to sell or retain stock.291
26. Do not merge with another corporation or otherwise acquire another
corporation's assets to the point that the status of the corporation as a 'close'
corporation will be lost."2
27. Allow a minority shareholder to inspect the corporate books without
making him or her obtain a court order to do so.29
28. Do not use any unnecessary delay tactics in a legal proceeding
involving a minority shareholder.2"

283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

See generally Annotation, supra note 176.
See supra note 168.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 171-77 and accompanying text.
See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
Id.
Xd
See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 184-92 and accompanying text.
See supra note 192 and accompanying text.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/3

34

1991]

Justis: Justis: Avoiding a Minority Shareholder
NEW CLOSE CORPORATION STATUTE

29. Maintain correct and complete corporate books.295
30. Take careful minutes at any corporate meeting and record them
accordingly.'
31. Have the officers of the close corporation make out reports of any
actions they may be called on to perform at corporate meetings.297
32. Do not assume that the obligation to voluntarily disclose to minority
shareholders all germane information concerning the close corporation is
discharged when such information is available for inspection in the corporate
books.
33. Do not loan any corporate money to any shareholder to pay for any
part of any share or shares of corporate stock.299
34. Make sure that all shares of stock are paid for with legal consider3
ation. Legal consideration is money, labor or property actually received. 1
35. Do not loan corporate money to a member of the close corporation
unless the loan will benefit the corporation. 0 1
36. Do not loan corporate money to another corporation in which a
member of the close corporation has a substantial financial or personal interest
unless it will benefit the close corporation.2
37. Corporate loans should never be low interest or interest-free and
should always be secured by a deed of trust, mortgage or other adequate
security.'
38. Make sure that any corporate loan given to a member of the close
corporation is made with the intention of being repaid and not in lieu of a
salary to avoid paying income taxes.3' 4
39. Do not issue a deed of trust, mortgage or bond on corporate property.
in favor of a member of the close corporation if the main objective is to allow
that member to obtain the property upon foreclosure.0 5
40. Do not issue new shares of stock or increase the authorized capital
of the close corporation without complying with the state laws and the bylaws
and articles of incorporation. 3°

295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 200-03 and accompanying text.
Id.

301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

See supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 199-208 and accompanying text.
See supra note 199.
See supra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.

306. See supra notes 212-14 and accompanying text.
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41. Do not use methods of recapitalization to allow officers, directors or
majority shareholders to strengthen their control over the close corporation.
42. Do not reduce the stated capital of a close corporation to effectively
raise the voting power of a majority shareholder or in violation of state
law.m
43. Do not allow an officer, director or majority shareholder to usurp a
business opportunity of the close corporation. 3°9
44. Do not create another corporation and transfer the assets and
operations of the close corporation to that corporation.3 °
45. Do not allow an officer, director or majority shareholder to invest or
otherwise participate in an independent, competitive business of the close
corporation. n
46. Invite minority shareholders to all annual meetings in which they are
entitled to vote with sufficient notice designating the place, date and hour of

the meeting. m
47. Make sure that notice of any meeting is delivered personally or by
mail 13not less than ten days and not more than fifty days before the meet3

ing.

48. Do not schedule any special meeting without the above stated notice
requirements along with the purpose(s) for which the meeting is called.314
49. Do not schedule any special meetings at an inconvenient time or
place for a minority shareholder if a convenient time and place is available.3 t
50. Allow minority shareholders to schedule a special meeting in
accordance with the bylaws of the close corporation. 16
51. Conduct meaningful corporate meetings with officer, director and
shareholder participation.317

307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

See supra notes 217-19
See supra notes 220-23
See supra notes 224-45
See supra notes 236-38
See supra notes 239-43
See supra notes 248-53
See supra note 252 and
See supra note 254 and
See supra note 255 and
See supra note 256 and
See supra note 257 and

and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
accompanying text.
accompanying text.
accompanying text.
accompanying text.
accompanying text.
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52. Do not allow one officer of the close corporation to dictate the
conduct of the other officers to the point where the other officers have no say
in corporate matters."'
53. Do not effectively cut off any right a minority shareholder may have
to any existing pension or profit-sharing plan from the close corporation.319
54. Invite minority shareholders to all corporate functions, whether the
functions are business or social.32
55. Do not treat minority shareholders with open hostility and disrespect
concerning corporate affairs. 321

VI. CONCLUSION
At least one lesson (and hopefully not the only lesson) should be apparent
from reading this Comment. Successful minority shareholder oppression
claims are on the rise in Missouri and in other jurisdictions across the country.
This incline is even sharper when the case involves a close corporation. The
Missouri courts have already kept a "tighter leash" on close corporations than
they have public corporations. The Missouri Legislature decided to reinforce
that leash in 1990.
GARY D. JUSTIS

318.
319.
320.
321.

See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 259-62 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 263-65 and accompanying text.
Id
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